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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 












CASE NO. 41392-2013 
Ada County No. 1981-10183 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In 1981, Defendant Lacey Mark Sivak (Sivak) was convicted for the first-degree 
murder of Dixie Wilson and sentenced to death. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
denial of sentencing-phase relief resulting in a new sentencing hearing before the state 
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district court. Sivak appeals from his fixed life sentence imposed after the new 
sentencing hearing, and the denial of his pro se Rule 3 5 motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts leading to Sivak's conviction for first-degree murder are summarized in 
State v. Sivak (Sivak I), 105 Idaho 900, 992, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), as follow: 
On April 6, 1981, Dixie Wilson, an attendant at a self service gas 
station, was discovered near death by a customer. She had been stabbed 
numerous times and shot several times. Evidence indicated she had also 
been sexually molested. She later died from her wounds. 
Witnesses saw two men inside the station with Wilson shortly 
before the murder, one they identified as Randall Bainbridge. Appellant 
and Bainbridge were seen together before and after the killing. 
Appellant admitted being present during the robbery and murder, 
but claimed he was merely an innocent bystander. He claimed he did not 
participate in the robbery and murder and did not carry a firearm. 
However, appellant's fingerprint was found on the murder weapon. 
Evidence indicated appellant had previously worked at the station, 
was known to the victim, had expressed animosity toward her, and had 
called to inquire who would be on duty at the station on April 6, 1981. 
The gun used in the attack was found in a storage shed rented by 
appellant. 
An Amended Information was filed charging Sivak with first-degree murder with 
alternatives for premeditated and felony-murder, robbery, use of a firearm during the 
robbery and murder, and a persistent violator enhancement. (#14435, R., pp.83-84.)1 
1 On November 4, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Augmenting Appeal, 
ordering that the appeal record in this case be augmented "to include the Court File, 
Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 14435." The state \Vill 
refer to documents from the direct appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court's Docket No. 
14435. The state's reference to the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record in this case 
will only be referenced by "R." and "Tr." While there are two volumes of transcript, the 
only transcript utilized by the state is the sentencing hearing conducted between August 
26, 2013 and August 28, 2013. Sivak's opening brief will be referenced by "Brief." 
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The jury found Sivak not guilty of premeditated murder, but guilty of felony-murder, 
robbery, and possession of a firearm. (Id., pp.103-08). The district court sentenced Sivak 
to death for Dixie's murder. (Id., pp.134-41).2 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
Sivak's conviction and death sentence. Sivak I, supra. 
The district court denied Sivak's first post-conviction petition. State v. Sivak 
(Sivak II), 112 Idaho 197, 199, 731 P.2d 192 (1987). The Idaho Supreme Court vacated 
Sivak's robbery conviction, concluding it "merged as a lesser included offense into his 
felony murder conviction as charged." Id. at 213. The court also reversed Sivak's death 
sentence because the district court denied his motion to present additional mitigation 
evidence prior to the court reimposing his death sentence. Id. at 200-03. 
On remand, the district court again sentenced Sivak to death. State v. Sivak 
(Sivak III), 119 Idaho 320,321, 806 P.2d 413 (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court reversed 
Sivak's death sentence because the district court failed to properly weigh the aggravating 
factors against the mitigating factors pursuant to State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 
P.2d 299 (1989). Sivak III, 119 Idaho at 321-22. 
On remand, Sivak was again sentenced to death with the district court finding four 
statutory aggravating factors, including: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious 
or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances 
stmounding its commission, Sivak exhibited utter disregard for human life; (3) the 
murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and accompanied with the 
specific intent to cause the death of a human being; and ( 4) Sivak exhibited a propensity 
to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. State v. 
2 Because the district court failed to deliver its written findings in open court, the Idaho 
Supreme Court remanded for reimposition of his sentence. Sivak I, 105 Idaho at 901 n.1. 
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Sivak (Sivak IV), 127 Idaho 387, 392 901 P.2d 494 (1995). Sivak subsequently filed a 
post-conviction petition, which the district court denied. Id. at 389. The Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed Sivak's death sentence and the denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 394. 
Sivak next commenced federal habeas proceedings. Sivak v. State (Sivak V), 134 
Idaho 641, 643, 8 P.3d 636 (2000).3 The federal district court denied Sivak all habeas 
relief. Sivak v. Hardison, 2008 WL 782877 (D. Idaho 2008). While the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed all guilt-phase issues, it reversed a sentencing claim stemming from suppression 
of exculpatory evidence and false testimony associated with Jimmy Leytham, who 
testified at Sivak's trial that Sivak confessed to murdering Dixie. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 
F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Sivak's case was remanded to the federal district court with 
instructions to enter an appropriate order requiring the state to resentence Sivak. 
On remand to the state district court, the state filed an amended notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty (R., pp.178-80), which was later withdrawn (id., pp.392-93). After 
a three-day hearing (Tr. 8-26-13 8-28-13), on August 28, 2013, the district court 
sentenced Sivak to fixed life without the possibility of parole for Dixie's first-degree 
murder (R., pp.529-31). A timely Notice of Appeal was filed September 3, 2013. (Id., 
pp.532-35.) On September 5, 2013, Sivak filed a prose "ICR 35(c and b) Request by 
Lacey to Correct Illegal Sentence" contending "life without parole means thirty years," 
that he should therefore be released because his sentence allegedly "expired" on April 8, 
2011, and his sentence was illegal because his resentencing was not conducted before a 
jury. (Id., pp.542-45) ( capitalization altered) ( emphasis and quotes omitted). 
3 During litigation of his federal habeas case, Sivak filed his third post-conviction 
petition, which the district court denied. Id. at 644. The Idaho Supreme Court 
subsequently affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Sivak V, supra. 
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ISSUES 
Sivak phrases the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Imposed A 
Sentence Of Life Without The Possibility Of Parole Upon Mr. 
Sivak Following His Conviction For First-Degree Felony Murder? 
2. Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. 
Sivak's Idaho Criminal Rule Motion Challenging His Sentence? 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues as follows: 
1. Has Sivak failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
fixed life sentence for Dixie's first-degree murder? 
2. Because the issue of leniency was not raised in Sivak's Rule 35 motion before the 
district court, is this Court barred from addressing the merits of his claim? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Sivak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Sivak contends he presented significant mitigation to the district court that 
justified the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence, which the district court failed to 
"adequately consider," including: (1) his age at the time he murdered Dixie; (2) his 
alleged potential for rehabilitation; (3) his current "health challenges," including the 
reoccurrence of bladder cancer that is currently in remission; ( 4) an "abusive childhood"; 
(5) substance abuse; and (6) continued family support. While the state does not dispute 
that evidence supporting these factors may constitute mitigation, there is no indication 
they were inadequately considered by the district court. Moreover, the underlying record 
disproves any reasonable inference that Sivak can ever be rehabilitated. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion." State v. 
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted). "In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence 
where reasonable minds might differ." Id. 
C. Sivak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing Sentence 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise of 
discretion are well established. Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant 
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Windom, 
150 Idaho 873,875,253 P.3d 310 (2011); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217 (2008). To carry this burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under 
any reasonable view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875 (citations omitted). A 
sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective 
of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution. Id. at 875-76; State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,577, 38 P.3d 614 (2001). 
First-degree murder, whether by premeditation or felony-murder, is punishable by 
death or fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004 (1981 ). Because his fixed life sentence 
is within the statutory limit, Sivak bears the burden on appeal of showing that his 
sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,604, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989). On 
appeal, the question is not what sentence this Court would have imposed, but rather, 
whether the district court abused its discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49; see also 
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Windom, 150 Idaho at 875 ("[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion 
vested in the trial court will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the 
trial court with its own."). Sivak has not demonstrated from the record any abuse of 
discretion in the district court's determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was 
not only warranted, but necessary under the facts of this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence requires a 
high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely released back into 
society or that the nature of the offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his 
life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149; State v. 
Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227 (1999)) (internal quotations and emphasis 
omitted). However, it must be recognized that Idaho's sentencing scheme does not 
mandate judicial findings of fact, nor is the district court '"required to recite or check off 
the sentencing guidelines ... during sentencing, nor is it even required to give reasons for 
imposing the sentence."' Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149 (quoting State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 
682, 688, 991 P.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1999)). Therefore, irrespective of whether the district 
court made explicit findings supporting Sivak's fixed life sentence cir failed to reference 
all of the mitigation considered, this Court is permitted to review the record to determine 
whether his fixed life sentence is warranted. See Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149-150. 
Sivak's first-degree murder of Dixie is obviously an "offense so egregious that it 
demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence." Cross, 132 
Idaho at 672. As explained at Sivak's trial, on April 6, 1981, at approximately 6:20 a.m. 
Harry Wilson (Harry) saw his wife, Dixie, leave their residence and go to work at a gas 
station. (#14435, Tr., pp.64-65.) Harry knew Sivak had worked at the same gas station 
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with Dixie before Sivak was fired approximately one month earlier because he was 
making false accusations against Dixie and making unnecessary phone calls. (Id., pp.66, 
68-71, 481-83 ). On April 4, just two days earlier, David Kartchner, an employee at the 
station, received a telephone call from an individual he believed was Sivak asking if the 
station would be open the following Monday, what time it would open, and who would 
be working. (Id., pp.509-10.) Kartchner explained the station was opening at 7:00 a.m. 
on Monday and Dixie would be working. (Id.) 
At approximately 6:35 a.m. on April 6, Timothy Ayres passed the gas station on 
his way home from work and saw Dixie behind the teller's booth; no one else was at the 
station. (Id., pp.89-92.) At approximately 6:45 a.m., Gary Chilton went inside the station 
and saw Dixie sitting behind the counter, but she was non-responsive to questions or 
conversation with two men present, one standing by the counter and the other standing to 
Chilton's right, who Chilton subsequently identified in a photo lineup as Randall 
Bainbridge, Sivak's co-defendant. (Id., pp.263-72.) After unsuccessfully trying to 
engage the individuals in conversation, Chilton paid for his gas and left. (Id., pp.282-83.) 
Gloria Layden arrived at the station at approximately 6:47 a.m., pulling up next to 
Dixie's car. (Id., pp.286-89.) While she never saw Dixie that morning, from her car 
Layden saw two men, the larger of the two standing beside the Coke machine and the 
other "squatting on the stool or stooping a little looking into the drawer making 
movements like that." (Id., pp.291-92.) "The drawer" was "where the till is" and the 
"movements" were "like he was going through the draw because he was moving fast." 
(Id., pp.292-93.) In a photo lineup, Layden identified the man beside the Coke machine 
as Sivak. (Id., pp.296-97.) After observing Sivak talk with the other man and while 
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walking toward the door, Layden decided she should leave and went home. (Id., pp.298-
99.) John Russell, controller for Baird Oil, subsequently determined $185 in cash and 
$200 in checks was missing. (Id., pp.464-66, 476.) 
At approximately 6:50 a.m., Ronald Hase arrived at the station, pumped his gas, 
walked to the pay window where a male hand "came out," paid for the gas, and walked 
away. (Id., pp.307-10.) John Roe arrived at the station at approximately 7:00 a.m. and 
waited for the pumps to turn on. (Id., pp.319-20.) James Bell arrived at the station just 
ahead of Roe. (Id., pp.320-21, 328-30.) Bell went inside because the pumps were not 
working, heard someone gasping for air and found Dixie lying on the floor. (Id., pp.330-
32.) Bell went outside to get help from Roe who rushed inside and also saw Dixie lying 
on the floor in "pretty bad" condition, naked from the top of her breasts down to her pants 
because her bra and shirt had been pulled up. (Id., pp.320-25.) 
Officer Gary Thurston, who saw Dixie enter the station in a "perfectly normal 
state" at approximately 6:32 a.m., was the first officer to arrive. (Id., pp.334-36.) 
Thurston went inside, found Dixie lying on the floor, and saw the till open with loose 
change inside but no bills, and an empty money bag. (Id., pp.349-52.) Dixie was 
transported to an emergency room (id., pp.367-70) where she died at 8:50 a.m. (id., 
pp.13-14). 
An autopsy was performed on Dixie's body. (Id., pp.19-20.) Dr. Delbert Scott 
concluded there were approximately twenty stab wounds on Dixie's body that could have 
been caused by a knife blade found at the murder scene and/or the tip of another knife 
blade, along with numerous other stab wounds that were insignificant and superficial. 
(Id., pp.43-44, 50-52.) Dr. Scott also found five gunshot entry wounds in Dixie's head or 
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neck, one that was consistent with her being in the "prone position" at the time of the 
shooting. (Id., pp.44-49.) Dr. Scott recovered bullets consistent with a .22 caliber 
weapon (id., p.48) and used an X-ray to locate the tip of a knife blade that was imbedded 
in Dixie's skull (id., pp.51-52). Dr. Scott determined the cause of death was gunshot 
wounds to Dixie's head. (Id., p.53.) 
At the murder scene, bullets were recovered. (Id., pp.379-81.) Officers obtained 
a warrant to search Sivak's rented storage shed and found a .22 handgun, a small 
derringer, a box of .22 caliber shells, and an extra cylinder, all "secreted in the old junked 
body of an automobile, inside the right-front light area of the car, the fender." (Id., 
pp.663-68, 685-91.) The .22 handgun, derringer, and extra cylinder had been stolen 
between March 15 and April 1, 1980, from Glen Romie who sold guns and employed 
Sivak's mother, Marion Sivak (Marion). (Id., pp.641-51.) Romie saw Sivak in the store 
between March 30 and April 1, when Sivak told Romie he had taken some BB pellets and 
put them in the cabinet where the .22 was kept; the following day the guns were missing. 
(Id., pp.651-53.) Wally Baker conducted ballistics testing and opined one of the bullets 
recovered from the murder scene "had been fired" from the .22, the second bullet "could 
have" been fired from the .22, and the bullet recovered from Dixie's skull "was [] fired" 
from the .22 recovered from Sivak's shed. (Id., pp.825-27.) Bernice Noyes conducted 
fingerprint analysis on the .22 and determined Sivak's fingerprints were on the barrel of 
the gun while there were no prints belonging to Bainbridge. (Id., pp.791-97.) 
Officers recovered Sivak's shirt worn the morning of Dixie's murder (id., pp.694-
704, 727-29) and obtained a warrant to search a 1972 Mercury Montego belonging to 
Marion (id., pp.714-16). Luminol testing inside the car revealed positive results for 
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blood. (Id., pp.753-55.) Sivak's shirt (id., pp.759-66) and the inside of the barrel and 
outside rim of the barrel of the .22 (id., pp.766-67) also tested positive for blood. 
On the day of Dixie's murder, Sivak telephoned Randy Mick at approximately 
8:00 p.m., inquired whether Mick had heard about the murder, and told Mick he had been 
at the station at 6:30 a.m. for about fifteen minutes because a friend wanted to buy 
cigarettes. (Id., pp.516-18.) Sivak also talked with Don Stephan that same night stating 
he and a friend had been at the station about twenty minutes prior to the murder to get 
gas. (Id., pp.636-38.) 
Two days after Dixie's murder, Sivak was interviewed by Vaughn Killeen and 
admitted, "he and Dixie Wilson did not get along with each other." (Id., p.675.) Sivak 
contended he picked up Bainbridge at approximately 6:30 a.m. on the morning of Dixie's 
murder and they went to the gas station to purchase cigarettes where they stayed for 
approximately five minutes talking with Dixie. (Id., pp.676-77.) Sivak denied any 
involvement in Dixie's murder, suggesting a possible suspect was Mike Hammer, who 
allegedly threatened an employee at the station. (Id., p.675.) 
Sivak testified at his trial and attempted to repudiate his statements to Killeen that 
he knew nothing about Dixie's murder. (Id., pp.904-05.) Sivak contended he had been 
asked by Bainbridge to help fix a van, picked up Bainbridge at his residence, went to the 
gas station to get cigarettes, and saw Bainbridge pull out a gun and state, "This is a 
robbery." (Id., pp.871-879.) Sivak contended he did not know Bainbridge had a gun or 
was planning on robbing Dixie, but thought "it was some kind of weird joke." (Id., 
p.879.) Sivak contended Bainbridge "smack[ed] [Dixie] in the back of the head" and she 
"drop[ped] down on the floor." (Id., pp.882-83.) Sivak did nothing because Bainbridge 
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allegedly said, "'Get into the back room or I'll blow your' -- or, you know, 'I'll kill you' 
type thing." (Id., p.883.) Bainbridge then pulled out a pocketknife, handed it to Sivak 
and told him to "cut her throat." (Id., p.884.) Sivak responded, "'You're nuts,' you 
know, 'I can't do anything like this."' (Id.) Bainbridge then "kneel[ed] down by Dixie 
and all I can remember seeing is the arm going up and down." (Id., p.885.) "All of a 
sudden [Bainbridge] [ stood] up and he start[ ed] pulling the trigger on the gun. . . . All I 
heard was, just a lot of shots. And then all of a sudden: click, click, click, like an empty 
gun." (Id., p.996.) "And then [Bainbridge] grab[bed] her shirt and all, and just pull[ ed] 
up on it with her in the sitting position and lifts." (Id., p.887.) Bainbridge then stated, 
"Well let's go on out front" while pointing the .22 at Sivak, but first taking the money 
from the till and the money bag. (Id., pp.887-88.) 
Sivak also admitted he was in the gun cabinet at Marion's employer (id., pp.859-
62) and that he stole the .22 used to murder Dixie (id., pp.958-60). After detailing the 
events surrounding Dixie's murder, Sivak explained how they hid the guns and 
ammunition, eliminated other evidence associated with her murder, went to Denny's, 
purchased a starter for the van, repaired the van and departed. (Id., pp.890-901.) 
Incredibly, during his allocution at his resentencing, Sivak changed his story and 
contended he lied about stealing the gun. (Tr., pp.548-54.) 
The prosecutor's cross-examination of Sivak revealed extensive inconsistencies, 
both internally and with the physical and forensic evidence and other witnesses' 
testimony. (#14435, Tr., pp.934-1011.) The inconsistencies were so obvious that on 
redirect Sivak conceded his attorneys had "been telling [him] that there are some weak 
spots in [his] testimony such as [those] pointed out by Mr. Harris." (Id., p.1013.) 
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Although the Ninth Circuit ordered that Sivak be resentenced, the court 
recognized the strength of the state's case regarding guilt, concluding, "The jury heard 
and rejected Sivak's contentions that he knew nothing about the plan to commit robbery 
and/or murder, that he did not participate in the robbery or murder, and that he was 
threatened into assisting Bainbridge cover up the crimes," Sivak, 658 F.3d at 913, which 
the district court noted during Sivak's resentencing. (Tr., p.581.) The district court also 
concluded Sivak's trial testimony and allocution were not credible (id., p.582) and that 
his new explanation for how the .22 got to the murder scene was "ridiculous" (id., p.585). 
The manner in which Dixie was murdered was so egregious that the district court 
recognized, "The victim tragically remained alive, during this torturous ordeal, for a long 
period of time thereafter" and "[n]o one could have killed [Dixie] in this manner and had 
any possible regard for [her] life." (#14435, R., p.137.) In discussing why the death 
penalty was initially imposed, the district court explained, "This defendant actively 
participated in the brutal savage slaying and sexually molesting of a woman while at the 
same time butchering her alive." (Id.) While the state was only requesting a fixed life 
sentence at Sivak's resentencing, the prosecutor appropriately recognized, "Those words 
were as true in 1981 as they are today." (Tr., p.425.) The facts surrounding Dixie's 
murder are so egregious that they demand an exceptionally severe measure of retribution 
and deterrence, irrespective of the state's inability to prove "which hand the knife was in 
or that the knives were in" or "who pulled the trigger or if the gun changed hands and 
both people pulled the trigger" (id., p.426), particularly in light of the fact that Bainbridge 
has also been given a fixed life sentence that was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247, 787 P.2d 231 (1990). 
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The state recognizes the Idaho Supreme Court '"has given great weight to the age 
of a defendant,"' State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144, 814 P.2d 401 (1991) (quoting 
State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 79, 577 P.2d 1123 (1978)), which Sivak contends was not 
adequately considered by the district court. (Brief, pp.7-8.) However, the mere age of a 
murderer does not warrant the imposition of a lesser sentence than fixed life where "the 
perpetrator could never be safely released back into society or . . . the nature of the 
offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 
Idaho at 876. For example, in State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 600-01, 261 P.3d 853 
(2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court viewed a sixteen-year-old murderer's fixed life 
sentence "in light of the gravity of the offense and the need to protect society from the 
defendant" and concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. Draper's co-
defendant, who was also a minor, was likewise given a fixed life sentence which was 
affirmed on appeal, State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484, 272 P.3d 417 (2012), even 
though the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "It was simply unnecessary for the State to 
prove Adamcik inflicted the fatal wound," id at 463. See also State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 
489, 494-97, 314 P.3d 171 (2013) (affirming a twenty-one-year-old murderer's fixed life 
sentence); Windom, 150 Idaho at 876-81 (affirming a sixteen-year-old murderer's fixed 
life sentence); State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 619-21, 21 P.3d 940 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(affirming a twenty-year-old murderer's fixed life sentence); State v. McKnight, 135 
Idaho 440, 441-42, 19 P.3d 64 (Ct. App. 2000) (same); State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
276-79, 1 P.3d 299 (Ct. app. 2000) (affirming an eighteen-year-old murderer's fixed life 
sentence); State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 408-09, 807 P.2d 610 (1991) (same). 
Obviously, if juveniles and adults younger than Sivak can be sentenced to fixed life after 
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having committed brutal murders, Sivak can be sentenced to fixed life where he was 
twenty-two at the time he mercilessly and brutally murdered Dixie. 
Sivak next contends the district court did not adequately consider his potential for 
rehabilitation, which is based primarily upon the "comprehensive social history" (CSH) 
compiled by Dr. Pablo Stewart. (Brief, pp.9-12.) However, the district court obviously 
considered the prospects of rehabilitation by stating it did "not find that [Sivak's] 
character and attitude indicate that the commission of another crime is unlikely." (Tr., 
p.585.) Moreover, the CSH compiled by Dr. Stewart should be given little if any weight 
because there is no indication he is qualified to render expert opinions; there is no resume 
or curriculum vitae establishing anything more than he is an "M.D." and "Psychiatric 
Consultant." (CHS, p. l.) Indeed, he expressly notes that he does "not offer a medical 
diagnosis regarding [Sivak]," but merely discusses various diagnoses allegedly given by 
others without attaching the reports or the other individuals' qualifications. (Id., p.2.) 
Dr. Stewart makes several conclusions that are based upon nothing more than supposition 
and speculation. For example, when he interviewed Marion, Dr. Stewart learned that 
when she was a child she lived in very poor circumstances requiring that she bathe once a 
week in the same water used by her brothers. (CHS, p.20.) Apparently, based upon this 
single fact, Dr. Stewart "had the impression that she was likely the victim of sexual abuse 
as a child." (Id.) There is simply no basis or support for this conclusion. 
More importantly, Dr. Stewart's CHS ignores Sivak's behavior while he's been 
incarcerated. Warden Randy Blades, who knew Sivak for ten years while Sivak was 
incarcerated (Tr., p.144), reported that over the years Sivak has been incarcerated since 
murdering Dixie in 1981, Sivak had 113 disciplinary offense reports (DOR) (Tr., pp.148-
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49). Incredibly, Sivak contends his "long history of behavioral write-ups do[es] not 
evince a future dangerousness or a likelihood that [he] will commit acts of violence in the 
future." (Brief, p.11.) Nothing could be farther from the truth, particularly since at least 
seven of his DORs involved the possession of weapons. (Tr., p.149.) Blades discussed 
an incident where sewing needles were hidden in Sivak's legal paperwork "to poke 
officers in the event that they try to look at his legal work." (Id., p.188.) Moreover, as 
Blades explained, the large number of DORs is particularly compelling "when you 
consider [Sivak] is in a cell 23 hours a day, so not a lot of access to things to get in 
trouble with unless it's at [his] cell door or being escorted someplace." (Id., pp.149-50.) 
Blades noted some prisoners "do a significant amount of time with zero DO Rs," and that 
"113 is in the top 1 percent." (Id., p.150.) Blades recognized Sivak was "given many 
more warnings than he received DORs," and because of Sivak's behavior he had to 
change procedures "in order to manage" him. (Id., pp.189-90.) Blades further explained 
that Sivak had "a total disregard of rules, even sanctions themselves to try to correct that 
behavior" (id., p.150) to the extent that prison officials stopped issuing DORs because it 
was a waste of resources since Sivak refused to change his behavior (id., p.155). 
Addressing whether Sivak would be "dangerous to the public," Blades opined, "with 
[Sivak's] total disregard for our rules and in return societal rules, I would be very 
concerned about him following those on the outside, and about revenge. I mean, there's 
particularly female staff, he fixates, and sends me mounds of paperwork calling them 
names and things like that, and I'm concerned about my staff." (Id., p.160.) 
Moreover, Sivak has prior convictions for burglary that ultimately resulted in his 
being given a five-year prison sentence. (PSI, p.6.) While in prison, Sivak was found in 
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possession of a handcuff key, a list of towns between the prison and Canada, a list of 
radio frequencies and radio locations, and the number of Idaho State Police units in 
different areas. (Id., p.8.) Based upon his possession of such items, it was reasonable for 
prison officials to infer Sivak was planning an escape. (Id.) 
Lieutenant Gretchen Woodland, who knew Sivak "fairly well" from her tenure at 
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) where he was housed, explained Sivak 
does not change his behavior even after being punished and that she would be 
"concerned" about releasing him into the community "[i]ust from knowing him within 
the facility and constantly trying to manipulate, not follow[ing] policy, not follow[ing] 
procedures, and that's in a prison setting. I would be very concerned for him to be in the 
public." (Id., pp.198-99.) Lieutenant Jacqueline Todd also knew Sivak from her tenure 
at IMSI and explained Sivak does not follow rules, but "just goes on like there's no 
sanctions." (Id., p.216.) When asked whether Sivak would be a "danger outside the 
prison," Todd responded, "Yes," and that she believes "he is going to show up at [her] 
house," that she doesn't trust him, and "[he] is just evil." (Id., p.218.) 
Contrary to Sivak's contention, his history indicates he cannot be rehabilitated 
and will always be an extraordinary threat to society. The state acknowledges his current 
health problems with bladder cancer. (Id., pp.266-85.) However, because of treatments 
that have been provided, as of July 9, 2013, "there was no disease recurrence." (Id., 
p.281.) Irrespective, Sivak's health issues, alleged abusive childhood, and substance 
abuse issues pale in comparison to the manner in which he savagely murdered Dixie, his 
utter lack of rehabilitative potential, and the need to protect society. 
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Finally, Sivak contends that he has "strong support from his mother and other 
family and friends." (Brief, p.16.) However, this alleged "support" should not be 
considered as mitigation, but aggravation because these individuals refuse to recognize 
the truth associated with Dixie's murder and are nothing more than enablers, particularly 
Marion. As explained by Dr. Stewart, when he interviewed Marion he found her to be 
"regressed, almost childlike." (CSH, p.20.) Incredibly, her home was "furnished in a 
bizarre manner" with a collection of dolls, "a great deal of junk," and a "light switch 
shaped like a penis." (Id.) Dr. Stuart opined, "Lacey was also raised by a mother who 
could not maintain healthy boundaries between mother and son. She was his best friend 
and main companion: she doted on Lacey and encouraged his immaturity and 
irresponsibility." (CSH, p.41.) One of the claims before the Ninth Circuit was the 
district court's alleged exposure to "'stories' and 'rumors' about Sivak having an 
'unnatural relationship' with his mother," with some individuals "mistakenly refer[ing] to 
[Sivak's] mother as his wife on several occasions." Sivak, 658 F.3d at 922-23. 
While Sivak also submitted multiple letters of support and testimony from non-
family members, the letters are from 1988 when he was resentenced to death. (R., p.734, 
Exhibit 3.) There is no indication these individuals are currently alive, let alone that they 
are willing to "support him in his attempt to reintegrate into society." (Brief, p.17.) 
Similarly, the "testimony" upon which Sivak relies is from his 1988 resentencing that 
was read to the district court, including Marion's prior testimony. (Tr., pp.291-377.) 
Only Pastor Philip Falk provided live testimony, explaining he was willing to continue 
being Sivak's spiritual advisor. (Id., pp.378-89.) While Pastor Falk opined Sivak is 
"honest," not "malicious," and that Sivak's problems inside the prison setting would not 
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translate into problems in a free society outside of prison (id., pp.386-88), Pastor Falk's 
opinion is clearly contrary to Sivak's thirty-three-year prison history, the testimony of 
prison officials who dealt with Sivak on a daily basis, and the savage manner in which he 
brutally murdered Dixie for which he has never demonstrated any remorse. 
The district court appropriately examined the factors of sentencing, particularly 
protection of society and those in LC. § 19-2521. (Id., pp.583-85.) Sivak has failed, 
under any reasonable view of the facts, to establish the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing a fixed life sentence. 
IL 
This Court Is Barred From Addressing Sivak's Rule 35 Argument Regarding Leniency 
Because It Is Being Raised For The First Time On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Because he failed to provide any additional evidence to support his Rule 35 
motion, Sivak merely contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion "because his sentence was excessive as initially imposed." (Brief, p.17.) 
Sivak's claim fails because he is raising the issue of leniency for the first time on appeal 
since his Rule 35 motion was based upon the allegations that his fixed life sentence was 
illegal because "life without parole means thirty years" and his sentence was not imposed 
by a jury. Irrespective, his claim fails because he provided no additional evidence 
warranting a reduction in his sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is a plea for leniency addressed to the 
sound discretion of the district court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,319, 144 P.3d 23 
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(2006). To prevail, the defendant must show the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838 (2007). 
C. Sivak's Rule 35 Motion Was Not A Plea For Leniency 
Sivak's Rule 35 motion was not a request for leniency, but an allegation that his 
sentence is illegal because "life without parole means thirty years" and since he was 
arrested on April 8, 1981, he contends his sentence expired on April 8, 2011. (R., p.543.) 
Sivak further contended his sentence is illegal because the state initially filed a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty and, therefore, he was entitled to jury sentencing. (Id., 
pp.543-44.) For the first time on appeal, Sivak contends his Rule 35 motion was a plea 
for leniency. (Brief, pp.17-18.) 
It is well settled that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider issues not raised 
in the court below." State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830,833,252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992)). This 
general principle of appellate law has been applied to motions under I.C.R. 35 with the 
Idaho Supreme Court explaining, "the issue of 'illegality' may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal without the trial court having first had an opportunity to consider the 
legality of the terms of the sentence." State v. Howard, 122 Idaho 9, 10, 830 P.2d 520 
(1992); see also State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 896, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A 
claim of an illegal sentence is not an issue that may be presented for the first time on 
appeal."). There is no reason to believe the same principle does not apply to a request for 
leniency being raised for the first time on appeal. Because the issue was not raised before 
the district court, this Court should decline to address the merits of Sivak's claim. 
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However, even if this Court addresses the merits of Sivak' s claim it fails because 
he failed to present the district court with any additional evidence to support a plea for 
leniency. To prevail on the merits of his claim, Sivak must "show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838 (2007). Because Sivak concedes "[n]either [he] nor his counsel presented any new 
information or documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion" (Brief, p.18), he has 
failed to meet his burden. Nevertheless, Sivak contends the district court should have 
reduced his sentence "because the sentence was excessive as originally imposed." (Brief, 
p.18.) Even if Sivak were not required to provide the district court with new or additional 
information to support his Rule 35 motion, it fails because, as explained above, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, he has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing a fixed life sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Sivak's first life sentence for Dixie's first-
degree murder and the denial of his Rule 35 motion be affirmed. 
DATED this J1h day of October, 2014. 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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